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THE INTERACTION OF FEDERAL LABOR
AND ANTITRUST POLICIES: AN





and John V Jansonius**
MULTI-EMPLOYER collective bargaining, a practice in which two
or more employers bargain jointly with labor unions that repre-
sent their employees, 1 has long been a common and accepted prac-
tice in the United States.2 Under the National Labor Relations Act 3 the
principal legal restraint on combinations of employers that have associated
for the purpose of negotiating a common labor contract has been the require-
ment that the union consent to the multi-employer bargaining unit.4 Em-
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1. For a general discussion of the legal status of multi-employer bargaining see: Rains,
Legal Aspects and Problems of Multi-Employer Bargaining, 34 B.U.L. REV. 159 (1954);
Willborn, A New Look at NLRB Policy on Multiemployer Bargaining, 60 N.C.L. REV. 455
(1982).
2. The National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1982) [hereinafter cited and
referred to as the NLRA or the Act] does not specifically approve or disapprove multi-em-
ployer bargaining. NLRA § 8(b)(4)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(A) (1982), provides that it is an
unfair labor practice for a union to "forc[e] or requir[e] any employer or self-employed person
to join any . . . employer organization." Courts have interpreted this provision to preclude
union coercion of employer participation in multi-employer bargaining. Mobile Mechanical
Contractors Ass'n v. Carlough, 664 F.2d 481, 485 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 975
(1982); Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Local 137, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 623 F.2d 1354, 1358 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1013 (1980), 449 U.S. 1112 (1981); Amax Coal Co. v. NLRB, 614 F.2d
872, 879 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 453 U.S. 322, 323-24 (1981); Union de Tron-
quistas Local 901 v. Arlook, 586 F.2d 872, 875 (1st Cir. 1978). Although this statutory refer-
ence to multi-employer bargaining is minimal, the National Labor Relations Board
[hereinafter referred to as the NLRB or the Board] has long held that collective bargaining on
a multi-employer basis is legal and appropriate. See Furniture Firms, 81 N.L.R.B. 1318, 1320
(1949); Associated Shoe Indus., 81 N.L.R.B. 224, 231 (1949); Shipowner's Ass'n, 7 N.L.R.B.
1002, 1040-41 (1938), appeal dismissed sub nom. AFL v. NLRB, 103 F.2d 933, 936 (D.C. Cir.
1939), aff'd, 308 U.S. 401, 412 (1940); see also NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449, 350 U.S.
87, 94-95 (1957) (multi-employer bargaining antedated Wagner Act).
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1982).
4. See NLRB v. Beckham, Inc., 564 F.2d 190, 192-94 (5th Cir. 1977); NLRB v. Hart,
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ployers undertake multi-employer bargaining for the purpose of equalizing
labor costs and achieving an economy of scale in contract negotiations. Nev-
ertheless, this practice has never been seriously challenged under federal an-
titrust laws.5 One explanation for the lack of antitrust scrutiny may be that
union assent to a multi-employer bargaining unit appears to insulate the
structure from the federal antitrust laws.6
Another form of employer bargaining combination, coordinated bargain-
ing agreements, does not appear as deserving of protection from the antitrust
laws. In coordinated bargaining employers agree to common objectives for
their separate negotiations with a union and assist each other in meeting
those objectives. A combination of four general features characterizes coor-
dinated bargaining 7 agreements: (1) an agreement among employers to pur-
sue common terms on matters of common interest in collective bargaining;
(2) an agreement by each employer to share information on the status of its
particular negotiations with a union; (3) an agreement by all employers to
lockout their employees in the event of a strike against an individual em-
ployer on an issue of mutual importance to all members of the coordinated
bargaining agreement; and (4) a lack of union consent to the employers' bar-
gaining relationship.
Historically, employer coordinated bargaining has not been a major force
in American labor relations.8 Nevertheless, the practice has substantial po-
tential as a means for equalizing and stabilizing labor costs. One reason for
employers in some industries to consider a coordinated bargaining structure
is the continuing decline in pattern bargaining in several major industries. 9
453 F.2d 215, 218 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 844 (1972); see also Charles D.
Bananno Linen Serv. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404, 420 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring) (union
consent required). The union consent requirement has not inhibited the growth of multi-em-
ployer bargaining. In 1978, the last year in which the Bureau of Labor Statistics maintained
statistics concerning the percentage of contracts negotiated on a multi-employer basis, 42% of
major collective bargaining agreements, representing approximately 3.2 million workers, were
negotiated on a multi-employer basis. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
BULLETIN No. 2065, CHARACTERISTICS OF MAJOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS
12 (1980).
5. For a discussion of the legality of multi-employer bargaining under the federal anti-
trust laws see infra notes 76-182 and accompanying text.
6. See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
7. The phrase "coordinated bargaining" has also been used to characterize union efforts
to combine forces in negotiating labor contracts covering two or more bargaining units at one
or more companies. See Cohen, Coordinated Bargaining and Structures of Collective Bargain-
ing, 26 LAB. L.J. 375, 380-81 (1975). Coordinated bargaining, as used herein, should also be
distinguished from the common practice of pattern bargaining. For a discussion of pattern
bargaining see infra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
8. The degree of use of employer coordinated bargaining cannot be accurately measured.
Employers engaging in coordinated bargaining have an incentive to keep the arrangement con-
fidential because, by definition, coordinated bargaining is conducted without union approval.
9. For a general discussion of the decline of pattern bargaining see Freedman & Fulmer,
Last Rites for Pattern Bargaining, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1982, at 30. See also COLLEC-
TIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS & CONTRACTS (BNA) No. 1053, at 3 (Oct. 10, 1985);
Phone Firms, Unions Prepare to Bargain, Wall St. J., Mar. 31, 1986, at 6, col. 1; Plant Pacts
May Succeed National Labor Agreements, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, July 29, 1985, at 6; What
Threatens Nationwide Truck Bargaining, Bus. WK., Oct. 15, 1984, at 46; The Beginning of the
End for Industrywide Wages?, Bus. WK., Mar. 5, 1984, at 78; Industrywide Wage Patterns Get
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In pattern bargaining employers in an industry adopt, with union approval,
a collective bargaining agreement negotiated by one company in the indus-
try. The decline in pattern bargaining is attributable to a variety of techno-
logical and economic developments that have reduced the unity of interests
among employers in industries that historically have set wages and terms
and conditions of employment on a nationwide or industrywide basis.' 0 Co-
ordinated bargaining enables employers affected by the breakup of pattern
bargaining to realign with a narrower group of employers who share com-
mon interests. " Employers in the coordinated bargaining group may pursue
particular contract terms that satisfy their individual needs and interests as
well as pool their economic strength to resist union pressure to continue with
pattern bargaining. 12
Coordinated bargaining may also be desirable to employers in deregulated
industries as a means of minimizing the effects of competition from upstart
companies. 13 In the airline industry, for example, deregulation has con-
fronted major carriers with competition from new airlines operating on a
nonunion basis with substantially lower labor costs.' 4 By pursuing labor
negotiations on a common front, the major carriers could minimize dispari-
ties in labor cost between themselves and could exert greater pressure on
unions to reduce labor costs to a level that would enable the carriers to com-
pete effectively with nonunion airlines.' 5
a Test in Copper, Bus. WK., July 18, 1983, at 58; Industrywide Rail Pact Near the End of the
Line, Bus. WK., Oct. 11, 1982, at 33.
10. See Freedman & Fulmer, supra note 9. Recent examples of industries in which a lack
of common interests is threatening pattern bargaining include the steel, rubber, oil, and lumber
industries. See, e.g., Changes in Steel Labor Talks Spark Confusion, Wall St. J., Apr. 7, 1986,
at 6, col. 1; Steel's Labor Strategy: Divide and Conquer, Bus. WK., May 20, 1985, at 64-65;
Union Selects Goodyear to Set Contract Pattern for Tire Industry, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA)
No. 69, at A-l (Apr. 10, 1985); Oil Industry Makes Bid to Win Concessions and Delays Most
Pacts, Wall St. J., Jan. 23, 1984, at 30, col. 1; Lengthy Strike at Louisiana-Pacific Tests Chair-
man's Resolve to Cut Starting Wages, Wall St. J., Oct. 17, 1983, at 33, col. 4 (lumber).
11. For discussion concerning the potential of coordinated bargaining see Hart, Union
Power and the Possibilities of De Facto Multi-Employer Collective Bargaining, 6 UCLA-
ALASKA L. REV. 155 (1977).
12. For the most part, employers will exercise the economic strength of coordinated bar-
gaining association through common interest lockouts in defense against strikes directed at
members of the coordinated bargaining association. A lockout is a refusal to allow employees
to work. The potential purposes of a lockout are pressuring a union to modify its position in
collective bargaining or supporting another employer that has been struck. A strike against
one member or against a few members of a multi-employer bargaining association is referred to
as a whipsaw strike. To counteract the damaging effects of a whipsaw strike on the struck
employer and to put greater pressure on the union, nonstruck employers in a multi-employer
association or coordinated bargaining association may lockout employees. For a general dis-
cussion of lockouts see Baird, Lockout Law: The Supreme Court and the NLRB, 38 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 396 (1970).
13. In the past decade federal deregulation has substantially affected the airline, trucking,
railroad, and intercity busing industries. The telecommunications and finance industries have
also experienced substantial deregulation in recent years. For an overview of the effects of
deregulation on American business see Deregulating America, Bus. WK., Nov. 28, 1983, at 80.
14. For a discussion of postderegulation efforts by the major air carriers to reduce labor
costs see Jansonius & Broughton, Coping With Deregulation: Reduction of Labor Costs in the
Airline Industry, 49 J. AIR L. & CoM. 501 (1984).
15. The Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 153-163 (1982), rather than the NLRA, gov-
erns analysis of the legality of multi-employer or coordinated bargaining in the airline indus-
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Finally, employers may find coordinated bargaining useful in minimizing
labor's bargaining strength in a geographical area where a union or unions
exert particularly strong influence.1 6 Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s
employers in the northeast and industrial midwest encountered growing
competition from companies in the southern and western states and in for-
eign countries where unions are less prevalent and influential. 17 By taking a
unified approach in collective bargaining and agreeing to support mutual
interests in their separate negotiations, employers in areas of strong union
influence can more effectively negotiate contract terms necessary to remain
competitive with outside companies.
In short, coordinated bargaining by employers has significant potential for
minimizing pressures exerted by organized labor and for negotiating con-
tracts that enable unionized employers to compete effectively with nonunion
companies. The impetus for coordinated bargaining will persist as multi-
employer collective bargaining associations continue to break up and as em-
ployers in a wide range of industries face mounting pressure from nonunion
competitors. This Article discusses the legality of employer coordinated bar-
gaining under federal labor and antitrust laws. Part I of this Article exam-
ines the legality of coordinated bargaining under the federal labor laws. Part
II addresses the antitrust implications of both coordinated and multi-em-
ployer' 8 collective bargaining.
I. APPLICATION OF FEDERAL LABOR LAWS TO COORDINATED
BARGAINING ARRANGEMENTS
Multi-employer bargaining associations have long possessed the right
under federal labor law to take concerted action designed to put economic
pressure on unions and employees in order to improve the employers' bar-
gaining position.19 Historically, the most potent economic weapon available
try. Attempts at multi-employer bargaining in the airline industry have not succeeded. See
Arouca & Perritt, Transportation Labor Law and Policy for a Deregulated Industry, 1 LAB.
LAW. 617, 645 n.184 (1985).
16. For a discussion of the potential use of coordinated bargaining to counter union domi-
nance in a geographical area see Hart, supra note 11.
17. The migration of population and industry from the American northeast to southwest
is discussed in J. NAISBEFr, MEGATRENDS 207-29 (1982). The difficulty facing American
industry due to foreign competition has been a steady topic of commentary in American jour-
nals and magazines for several years. Recent discussions of the labor implications of foreign
competition include: Orr & Orr, Job Cuts Are Only One Means Firms Use to Counter Imports,
MONTHLY LAB. REV., June 1984, at 39; Schlein, Brown & Sleemi, Collective Bargaining in
1986, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Jan. 1986, at 16; The Effect of Labor Costs on International
Competitiveness of 130 U.S. Industries, Bus. AM., Sept. 20, 1982, at 7; Labor's Bid to Keep
Plants from Moving, Bus. WK., Jan. 24, 1983, at 25; International Forces Will Prevail, But Will
Unions Be Able to Change with the New Global Work Place?, PERSONNEL ADMIN., Dec. 1983,
at 100.
18. In considering the legality of coordinated bargaining arrangements, this Article fo-
cuses on the application of the federal antitrust laws to multi-employer bargaining. While the
legality of multi-employer bargaining under the labor laws is well established, there is little
antitrust authority on point. Even so, the legality of coordinated bargaining under the anti-
trust laws is a major component of the legality of multi-employer bargaining.




to employers has been the lockout. 20 Offensive lockouts, ones that are not in
response to a strike against another member of the employers' association,
are permissible so long as the employers are not motivated by anti-union
animus and the purpose of the lockout is not solely to undermine the union's
status as bargaining agent.2 1 In addition to allowing employers to pool eco-
nomic strength in negotiations through a lockout, multi-employer bargain-
ing enables employers to achieve an economy of scale in collective
bargaining and to minimize labor costs as a competitive factor. 22 Coordi-
nated bargaining represents an attempt by employers to gain the advantages
of multi-employer collective bargaining when union consent to formal multi-
employer bargaining is unavailable or when individual employers prefer not
to commit to multi-employer bargaining.
A. Union Consent to Expansion of Bargaining Unit
Employers are not free to impose multi-employer bargaining unilaterally
on a union in order to obtain the bargaining leverage and protections that
membership in a multi-employer bargaining association can offer. 23 Indeed,
in order to obtain the benefits of a multi-employer unit when a union has
objected to formation of such a unit, the participating employers must show
that the union has otherwise manifested an unequivocal intent to bargain on
a multi-employer basis. 24 Nevertheless, union consent to bargain on a multi-
employer basis has rarely been an issue in disputes before the National Labor
Relations Board or the courts. 25 When the issue has arisen, the Board has
20. See supra note 12. Employers can also exert economic pressure on a union striking
against a competitor through a mutual aid pact. In the airline industry, for example, until the
mid-1970s, the major carriers participated in a mutual aid pact that involved sharing revenues
with carriers facing a strike. See OFFICE OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, CIVIL AERONAUTICS BD.,
STAFF REPORT, COMPETITION AND THE AIRLINES: AN EVALUATION OF DEREGULATION
112 n.13 (1982).
21. Employers may also use offensive lockouts before an impasse in negotiations if the
lockouts are based on legitimate business concerns. See American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB,
380 U.S. 300 (1965).
22. See, e.g., Darling & Co., 171 N.L.R.B. 801 (1968), aff'd sub nom. Lane v. NLRB, 418
F.2d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (illustrating impact of pooled lockout to avoid impact of untimely
whipsaw strikes).
23. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. The converse is also true. A union cannot
compel an employer to bargain on a multi-employer basis absent consent by the employer. See
Mine Workers Local 1854, 238 N.L.R.B. 1583 (1978), enforced in part sub noma. Amax Coal
Co. v. NLRB, 614 F.2d 872 (3d Cir. 1980). There is authority that the Board has power to
order multi-employer bargaining, see Tennessee Prods. & Chem. Corp. v. NLRB, 423 F.2d
169, 177-78 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970), but the Board has never exercised this
apparent authority without an agreement or an established practice by the parties.
24. See Painters Local 1247, 233 N.L.R.B. 980, 982 (1977) (union not obligated to bar-
gain on multi-employer basis with members of employers' association that had not been recog-
nized by union); Stouffer Corp., 101 N.L.R.B. 1331 (1952). But cf Teamsters Local 705, 210
N.L.R.B. 210 (1974) (union unlawfully refused to bargain on individual basis with employer
that was represented by same bargaining agent that represented multi-employer bargaining
association of which employer was not a member).
25. As a practical matter, unions have historically preferred multi-employer bargaining to
promote equality in members' wages, terms, and conditions of employment, and to use union
bargaining resources efficiently. Unions find multi-employer bargaining less attractive, how-
ever, when the multi-employer group does not include a dominant portion of employers in an
industry or geographical area. Most reported decisions on the union consent issue involve a
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held that union consent to negotiate with an employers' association may be
established circumstantially notwithstanding the union's denial that it
agreed to bargain on a multi-employer basis. 26 This holding is consistent
with the Board's position on employer consent to participation in multi-em-
ployer bargaining. 27
In the vast majority of cases involving union objections to multi-employer
bargaining, the Board's determination concerning intent depends on the
existence of a history of bargaining on a multi-employer basis.2 8 The Board
has never clearly delineated how a sufficient bargaining history is identi-
fied.29 The safest conclusion is that union negotiation with an authorized
representative of an employers' association for a single contract covering all
association members is strong evidence of unequivocal intent. 30
The foregoing principles illustrate the importance of union cooperation in
union withdrawal from a multi-employer bargaining arrangement that is unsatisfactory to the
union. See, e.g., NLRB v. Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 70, 470 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1972)
(court found that union unlawfully withdrew from multi-union, multi-employer unit), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973); Teamsters Local 705, 210 N.L.R.B. 210 (1974) (union consis-
tently bypassed employer association); Sheet Metal Workers Local 110, 191 N.L.R.B. 182
(1971) (union violated the Act by refusing to execute collective bargaining contract with multi-
employer association), enforced, 69 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 13,145 (6th Cir. 1972); Stouffer Corp.,
101 N.L.R.B. 1331 (1952) (union with ten-year history of multi-employer negotiation sought
to abandon such negotiation).
26. For a detailed discussion of the factors considered in determining whether a union has
consented to multi-employer bargaining see C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 476-
79 (2d ed. 1983); Willborn, supra note 1, at 468-71 & nn.84-99.
27. See NLRB v. New York Typographical Union, 632 F.2d 171, 183 (2d Cir. 1980);
NLRB v. Preston H. Haskell Co., 616 F.2d 136, 139 n.10 (5th Cir. 1980); McAx Sign Co. v.
NLRB, 576 F.2d 62, 64-66 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979); Electric The-
atre, 156 N.L.R.B. 1351, 1352-53 (1966); Bennett Stone Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 1422, 1424-25
(1962).
28. See Crane Sheet Metal, Inc. v. NLRB, 675 F.2d 256 (10th Cir. 1982); NLRB v. Team-
sters Local 378, 672 F.2d 741 (9th Cir. 1982). In the context of employer consent to multi-
employer bargaining, one court defined the test for unequivocal intent to bargain as part of a
multi-employer association as follows: "[T]he relevant test [is] in the disjunctive: a multi-
employer bargaining unit may be established either by 'a controlling history of collective bar-
gaining on such basis, or an unequivocal agreement of the parties to bind themselves to a
course of group bargaining in the future.''" McAx Sign Co. v. NLRB, 576 F.2d 62, 66 n.3 (5th
Cir. 1978) (emphasis in original), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979). Professor Willborn criti-
cizes the McAx disjunctive test because the test could bind an employer or union to bargaining
on a multi-employer basis without adequate consent. Willborn, supra note 1, at 470 n.93. A
history of multi-employer bargaining as conclusive evidence of unequivocal intent to bargain
on a multi-employer basis is also a factor in determining whether a union consented to multi-
employer bargaining. See Painters Local 1247, 233 N.L.R.B. 980, 985 (1977).
29. See generally C. MORRIS, supra note 26, at 477-78.
30. Adoption of a labor contract negotiated by an employer association is not in itself a
sufficient expression of intent to be bound to multi-employer bargaining. Iron Workers Local
433, 266 N.L.R.B. 154, 159 (1983). The District of Columbia Circuit recently held that a
union's history of adopting agreements negotiated by a multi-union committee, combined with
the union's presence in multi-union negotiating sessions, did not evidence the union's unequiv-
ocal intent to be bound by a new contract negotiated by the multi-union association. Team-
sters Local 174 v. NLRB, 723 F.2d 966, 975 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
Professor Willborn has pointed to the following factors as evidencing a lack of sufficient
multi-employer bargaining history to warrant a finding of unequivocal intent: execution of
individual contracts rather than group contracts, the absence of a formal organization, and
failure to empower the bargaining agent with sufficient authority to execute a binding agree-
ment. Willborn, supra note 1, at 470-71 & nn.94-98.
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the formation of an employers' association for purposes of collective bargain-
ing. Absent union consent a newly formed employers' association cannot
occupy a formal role in the collective bargaining process. The remainder of
Part I analyzes the legality of coordinated bargaining strategies through un-
recognized employers' associations.
B. Decisions Under the National Labor Relations Act Concerning the
Legality of Employer Coordinated Bargaining
Section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act prohibits employers
from refusing to engage in collective bargaining with employee representa-
tives. 31 This duty to bargain implies that employers must negotiate in good
faith32 and refrain from attempting to force bargaining beyond the scope of
the appropriate bargaining unit.33 Unions may challenge coordinated bar-
gaining as an unfair labor practice under at least two related theories based
on section 8(a)(5) of the Act.34 First, by agreeing with other employers to
pursue common terms on some or all subjects of bargaining, an employer
reduces its willingness or ability to be flexible in negotiations. 3 Second, a
coordinated bargaining agreement necessarily injects the interests of other
employers into negotiations, thereby compelling unions to bargain on a
multi-employer basis.36
In the few cases in which the Board has had an opportunity to rule on the
legality of unrecognized employer bargaining associations,37 the Board has
stopped short of holding that the Act either permits or prohibits coordinated
bargaining arrangements. In some cases the Board has taken an expansive
view of union consent to the arrangement and thereby has found the exis-
tence of a multi-employer collective bargaining unit.38 In others the Board
31. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982).
32. Id. § 158(d). See generally C. MORRIS, supra note 26, at 570-79.
33. See Weyerhaeuser Co., 166 N.L.R.B. 299 (1967), enforced, 398 F.2d 770 (D.C. Cir.
1968); Stein Printing Co., 204 N.L.R.B. 17 (1973); Council of Bagel & Bialy Bakeries, 175
N.L.R.B. 902 (1969).
34. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982). See generally Burbash & Wile, Employer Cooperation in
Bargaining: Antitrust and NLRA Limitations, 38 N.Y.U. CONF. ON LAB. § 11.01 (1985). Co-
ordinated bargaining agreements may also be challenged on grounds that the participating
employers are unlawfully interfering with protected employee rights and the union's role as
bargaining representative. See Stein Printing Co., 204 N.L.R.B. 17 (1973); Weyerhaeuser Co.,
166 N.L.R.B. 299 (1967), enforced, 398 F.2d 770 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
35. Under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1982), the Second Circuit held that a
form of coordinated bargaining by employers did not impermissibly compromise the employ-
ers' duty to bargain in good faith. In Kennedy v. Long Island R.R., 319 F.2d 366, 370 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 830 (1963), the court held that creation of a mutual strike insur-
ance fund by employers outside of multi-employer bargaining did not violate the employers'
duty under the Act to make reasonable efforts to arrive at and maintain agreements.
36. A coordinated agreement that precludes employer execution of a union agreement
before other employers' negotiations are complete places the nonexecuting employer in viola-
tion of NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982).
37. Union recognition of an employer's bargaining association subjects the bargaining re-
lationship to NLRB rules on multi-employer bargaining. See supra notes 19-21 and accompa-
nying text.
38. See Weyerhaeuser Co., 166 N.L.R.B. 299 (1967), enforced, 398 F.2d 770 (D.C. Cir.
1968); see also Stein Printing Co., 204 N.L.R.B. 17 (1973); Council of Bagel & Bialy Bakeries,
175 N.L.R.B. 902 (1969).
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limited its inquiry to the specific conduct challenged by the complainant
union without discussing the legality of the employers' bargaining arrange-
ment. 39 The former approach is well illustrated by the Board's decision in
Weyerhaeuser Co. 40
Weyerhaeuser arose after four members of a newly formed multi-employer
bargaining association locked out employees in support of two other associa-
tion members who had been struck by the unions representing their employ-
ees.4 1 At the time of the concerted lockouts the unions had not expressly
recognized the association, neither had the unions ever bargained jointly
with the six employers. In response to the association's lockout the union
filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Board alleging that the employ-
ers that were not experiencing strikes were discriminating against the union
and employees for engaging in protected activity.4 2
Initially, the Board dismissed the complaint against the employers and
upheld the lockout as legal. 4 3 The Board indicated that employers have the
right to engage in coordinated bargaining activity.44 By condoning eco-
39. See Evening News Ass'n, 145 N.L.R.B. 996 (1964), enforcement denied sub noma. De-
troit Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 346 F.2d 527 (6th Cir. 1965), vacated and re-
manded, 382 U.S. 374 (1966), on remand, 166 N.L.R.B. 6 (1967), aff'd sub nom. Newspaper
Drivers Local 372 v. NLRB, 404 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 923 (1969);
see also Nordstrom, Inc., 229 N.L.R.B. 601 (1977). Unfair labor practice charges concerning
employers' conduct in coordinated bargaining arrangements fall in three categories. First,
NLRA § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982), requiring employers to bargain with the repre-
sentative of their employees, provides the most plausible challenge to coordinated bargaining.
As a result of employer participation in a coordinated bargaining association, the union may
argue that an employer refuses to bargain separately with the union. See Evening News Ass'n,
154 N.L.R.B. 1494 (1965), enforced sub nom. Detroit News Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 372
F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1967). Second, under NLRA § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982), a
union could allege that a lockout or other action taken to protect or benefit association mem-
bers interferes with or restrains employees in the exercise of their rights protected under
NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). Third, under NLRA § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)
(1982), a union could challenge an employers' association's actions on the grounds that the
association members are discriminatorily attempting to discourage membership in the labor
union.
40. 155 N.L.R.B. 921 (1965), vacated and remanded sub nom. Western States Regional
Council 3 v. NLRB, 365 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1966), on remand, 166 N.L.R.B. 299 (1967),
enforced, 398 F.2d 770 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
41. The labor organizations involved in Weyerhaeuser were the International Woodwork-
ers of America, AFL-CIO, Western States Regional Council 3, and the Western Counsel of
Lumber and Sawmill Workers, AFL-CIO. In addition to Weyerhaeuser, employers involved
in the litigation included Crown Zellerbach Corp., Rayonier Inc., and International Paper Co.
The struck employers were U.S. Plywood Corp. and St. Regis Paper Co.
42. The complaint filed by NLRB Region 31 alleged, in accordance with the union's
charge, that the nonstruck employers discriminated with respect to tenure and terms and con-
ditions of employment in violation of NLRA § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982), and inter-
fered with, restrained, and coerced employees in violation of NLRA § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(1) (1982).
43. 155 N.L.R.B. at 923.
44. The Board stated:
Whatever the precise status of the Association, . . . it is clear that, at the least,
it served as the designated bargaining representative through which its six mem-
bers bargained jointly with the Unions during those negotiations ....
... Even assuming, therefore, that the [employers] were mistaken as a matter
of law with respect to either the establishment or the recognition of the Associa-
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nomic reprisals to support the bargaining position of members of an unrec-
ognized employers' association, the Board tacitly approved of coordinated
collective bargaining by employers.
On appeal, however, the District of Columbia Circuit expressed concern
over unanswered questions in the Board's decision. 4 5 In particular, the cir-
cuit court requested a clarification of whether a single bargaining representa-
tive possessed authority from the six members of the employers' association
to negotiate a labor contract. 46 The court also wanted a determination of
the importance of union approval of the bargaining relationship agreed to by
the employers. 47 On remand the Board backed away from its previous deci-
sion that acknowledged the legality of coordinated bargaining by employers
and held instead that the union had consented to multi-employer
bargaining. 48
Shortly before its decision on remand in Weyerhaeuser the Board upheld
the legality of a lockout in a case in which no basis existed for finding that
the employers were part of a multi-employer association. 49 Newspaper Driv-
tion as a multiemployer unit .... we find that the principles announced by the
Supreme Court in American Ship Building and Brown Food apply to the situa-
tion where, as here, two or more employers bargain jointly with a union, an
impasse in negotiations is reached over a mandatory subject of bargaining, and
the union strikes only some of the employers engaged in such joint bargaining.
Id. at 922-23 (footnote omitted; emphasis added). For a discussion of American Ship Bldg.
Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965), and NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965), see infra note
49.
45. Western States Regional Council 3 v. NLRB, 365 F.2d 934, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
46. Id. at 938-39.
47. Id. The Sixth Circuit's remand of the Board's initial decision in Weyerhaeuser can be
viewed in two ways. By failing to affirm the decision, the court arguably disapproved of the
Board's tacit finding that coordinated bargaining is legal under the NLRA. Alternatively, the
Sixth Circuit's remand may simply have reflected uncertainty over the Board's actual holding
concerning coordinated bargaining.
48. Weyerhaeuser Co., 166 N.L.R.B. 299 (1967), enforced, 398 F.2d 770 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
The Board stated:
The test to be applied in assessing the status of the Association as a multiem-
ployer unit is well established: it is whether the members of the group have
indicated from the outset an unequivocal intention to be bound in collective
bargaining by group rather than individual action, and whether the union repre-
senting their employees has been notified of the formation of the group and the
delegation of bargaining authority to it, and has assented and entered upon ne-
gotiations with the group's representative....
[. B]oth [unions] treated with the Association qua Association, by submit-
ting their proposals to the Association as such and by responding to its offers as
group offers.
166 N.L.R.B. at 299-300 (emphasis in original, citation omitted).
49. Two years earlier, in American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965), the
Supreme Court had held that after an impasse in negotiations an employer may lawfully lock
out its employees "for the sole purpose of bringing economic pressure to bear in support of his
legitimate bargaining position." Id. at 318. In NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965), decided
on the same day as American Ship, the Court held that members of a multi-employer associa-
tion may lawfully lock out all employees represented by a union that struck one of the employ-
ers in the association. Id. at 281-82. The Court, in American Ship and in Brown, reasoned that
a court must seek independent evidence of anti-union motivation before holding a lockout
unlawful because a lockout is not a form of employer conduct so destructive of collective
bargaining that employer motivation is irrelevant. 380 U.S. at 309; 380 U.S. at 289.
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ers Local 3 72 v. NLRB (Detroit News) 50 involved two publishers, the Detroit
News and the Detroit Free Press, that had negotiated separately with Team-
sters Local 372 on contracts covering drivers of newspaper delivery trucks.51
In preparation for their respective contract renewal negotiations in 1962, the
newspapers secretly agreed that if the union struck one paper over an issue
that both papers considered important, 52 the other publisher would lock out
its employees. Accordingly, when the union called a strike against the De-
troit Free Press, the Detroit News ceased publishing and closed its doors to
employees.
The union responded to the lockout by filing an unfair labor practice
charge claiming, among other things,53 that the Detroit News's lockout in
favor of another employer's bargaining position was motivated by a desire to
undermine the union's status as bargaining agent. The Board, and the Sixth
Circuit on appeal, rejected this argument. The circuit court explained that
since any concessions granted to the union by the struck Detroit Free Press
could adversely affect the Detroit News's bargaining position, the News's
support of the Free Press was motivated by a desire to enhance its own posi-
tion and not by a desire to undermine the union's bargaining agent status.54
50. 404 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 923 (1969), enforcing 166
N.L.R.B. 219 (1967).
51. The Detroit News and Detroit Free Press had historically negotiated on a multi-em-
ployer basis with Teamsters Local 372. This relationship ended in the early 1960s when the
union withdrew from the multi-employer bargaining. The newspapers, however, refused to
recognize the union's withdrawal from multi-employer bargaining. The Sixth Circuit ulti-
mately found that the newspapers had violated NLRA § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982),
by refusing to bargain on a single employer basis with the union. Evening News Ass'n, 154
N.L.R.B. 1494 (1965), enforced sub nom. Detroit Newspapers Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 372
F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1967).
52. In multi-employer bargaining, it is common and lawful for the parties to assign certain
issues to multi-employer bargaining and to leave other issues to local or single employer bar-
gaining. See, e.g., Kroger Co., 148 N.L.R.B. 569 (1968); Radio Corp. of America, 135
N.L.R.B. 980 (1962).
53. The union first argued that the Detroit News's lockout was not valid under the stan-
dards set forth in American Ship since the Detroit News and the union had not reached an
impasse in negotiations. The Board rejected this argument, finding the parties "deadlocked on
key issues." 166 N.L.R.B. at 221-22. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit held that the terms "im-
passe" and "deadlock" are synonymous. 404 F.2d at 1160. The Board subsequently rejected
the union's argument that American Ship does not apply in a pre-impasse context. Darling &
Co., 171 N.L.R.B. 801 (1968), aff'd sub nom. Lane v. NLRB, 418 F.2d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
The union did not argue that the secret agreement between the Detroit News and Detroit
Free Press constituted an unlawful refusal to bargain. The Sixth Circuit nevertheless ad-
dressed these NLRA § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982), considerations in the newspapers'
coordinated bargaining strategy. The court concluded that the employers had not unlawfully
attempted to force the union into multi-employer bargaining. 404 F.2d at 1161-62 n.2. The
court reasoned that "[t]here was no attempt here to obtain the benefits of a multi-employer
bargaining unit since the agreement concerned only a few of several issues and since neither
employer agreed to be bound by the negotiations of the other." Id. at 1162 n.2.
54. The court stated:
By locking out its employees, the News sought to advance its own immediate
bargaining position by supporting the struck employer in its attempt to with-
stand the union's demands on the vital issues. Clearly, concessions granted by
the struck employer could be expected to have an adverse effect on the News'
ability to adhere to its own position. Thus.... the interest of the News in using
economic pressure was grounded upon a very real, direct, and immediate bar-
gaining motivation to advance its own cause.
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This decision, and the Board's initial decision in Weyerhaeuser, indicate
that employers are free to engage in coordinated collective bargaining, at
least to the extent of applying economic pressure to union and employees in
support of the employers' mutual interests. This power to combine eco-
nomic forces in negotiation with a union gives employers much of the power
they would enjoy in multi-employer collective bargaining. As discussed in
the following section, the degree of permissible cooperation in coordinated
bargaining has been explored in greater detail in situations analogous to em-
ployer coordinated bargaining when representatives of several employee bar-
gaining units combine forces in negotiating separate contracts with one or
more employers.
C. Legality of Coordinated Bargaining by Unions Under the Act
1. Relevance of Union Coordinated Bargaining Cases
In contrast to the scarce authority discussing coordinated bargaining by
employers, much authority exists discussing and establishing the legality of
coordinated bargaining by unions."5 Management and labor have equivalent
obligations to bargain in good faith 56 and refrain from efforts to compel col-
lective bargaining beyond the recognized bargaining unit.57 Because of these
corresponding duties union coordinated bargaining cases may serve as analo-
gous authority in support of employer coordinated bargaining.
The analogy is weakened, however, by one difference in the circumstances
of employers and unions bargaining on a coordinated basis. Whereas unions
are incapable of implementing contract terms of mutual interest to them,
employer participants in coordinated bargaining have the power to imple-
ment desirable contract terms unilaterally once negotiations break down. 58
Thus, from a policy standpoint, opponents of employer coordinated bargain-
404 F.2d at 1161.
55. See Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 658 F.2d 968 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 879 (1982); NLRB v. Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co., 599 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1014 (1980); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 415 F.2d 174 (8th Cir.
1969); General Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1969); Standard Oil Co. v. NLRB,
322 F.2d 40 (6th Cir. 1963); Note, Multi-Unit Collective Bargaining: Autonomy and Depen-
dence in Liberal Thought, 72 GEO. L.J. 1369 (1984). Coordinated bargaining by labor "is a
negotiating technique whereby a union coordinates its bargaining with other unions or other
bargaining units by including on its negotiating panel members of such other unions or bar-
gaining units." NLRB v. Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co., 599 F.2d 185, 190 n.4 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1014 (1979).
56. NLRA § 8(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (1982), makes it an unfair labor practice for a
union to refuse to bargain with an employer whose employees the union represents. As ap-
plied, § 8(b)(3) imposes a duty to bargain in good faith on unions. See Maas & Feduska, Inc.
v. NLRB, 632 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1979); Associated Gen. Contractors of America v. NLRB,
465 F.2d 327 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1108 (1972).
57. See Douds v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 241 F.2d 278, 282 (2d Cir. 1957)
(union unlawfully demanded inclusion of employees outside geographical area of recognized
unit).
58. Once a good faith impasse in negotiations is reached, an employer may unilaterally
implement the terms of its final proposal to the union. See generally Murphy, Impasse and the




ing could contend that employer coordinated bargaining carries greater po-
tential for affecting the outcome of negotiations and is not merely the flip
side of union coordinated bargaining. 59
2. Case Law Concerning Union Coordinated Bargaining
In its 1962 decision in Standard Oil Co. 60 the Board held that a union has
the right to select individuals from outside the bargaining unit to serve on
the union's bargaining committee and that this right is not lost merely be-
cause the committee members might coordinate positions and strategies for
negotiations concerning other bargaining units.6 1 Since that decision union
freedom to select members of a bargaining committee has been translated
into a generalized right to engage in coordinated bargaining. 62 Unions may
not, however, attempt to pressure employers into negotiations going beyond
the recognized bargaining unit.63
Since the legality of union coordinated bargaining is well established, re-
cent cases have focused on efforts by employers to frustrate union coordi-
nated bargaining strategies. In Procter & Gamble Manufacturing Co.64
unfair labor practice charges were directed at Procter & Gamble's refusal to
accommodate employees at four different Procter & Gamble plants. The
employees had been collectively chosen by unions65 as bargaining committee
59. The Board has relied on the ability of employers to effect changes in employment in
holding employer campaign promises illegal and union campaign promises legal. See generally
R. WILLIAMS, P. JANUS & K. HUHN, NLRB REGULATION OF ELECTION CONDUCT 63
(1974) (management promises often relate to matters that management controls). An addi-
tional distinction between union coordinated bargaining and employer coordinated bargaining
that is relevant to this analysis is the antitrust laws' exemption for union activity. One com-
mentator noted that courts may be inclined to apply the NLRA more restrictively to union
coordinated bargaining since the antitrust laws' protections are not available to curb potential
union abuses. Conversely, courts might view labor's antitrust exemption as a mandate for
liberal approval of union conduct related to collective bargaining. See Hart, supra note 11, at
162 & nn.32-34.
60. 137 N.L.R.B. 690 (1962), enforced, 322 F.2d 40 (6th Cir. 1963).
61. Id. at 690.
62. See General Elec. Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 253 (1968), enforced, 412 F.2d 512 (2d Cir.
1969).
63. In NLRB v. Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co., 599 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1014 (1980), the court stated:
[A]n employer may not lawfully refuse to bargain with a union negotiating com-
mittee or committees simply because the union is coordinating the various bar-
gaining efforts and the employer suspects or anticipates that the union may
ultimately use this coordination to force it into company-wide negotiations.
Rather, to justify a refusal to bargain on that score, an employer must demon-
strate that the coordinated bargaining in question is done in bad faith with the
purpose of forcing a company-wide bargaining situation-that is, that the union
is actually abusing the device and not simply that the union might do so in the
future.
Id. at 191.
64. 248 N.L.R.B. 953 (1980), enforced, 658 F.2d 968 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 879 (1982).
65. The controversy in Procter & Gamble involved negotiations for new contracts at
Procter & Gamble's plants in Port Ivory, New York, Kansas City, Kansas, Dallas, Texas, and
Baltimore, Maryland. Each plant had a separate bargaining unit and separate, independent
unions represented the employees in the various plants. Independent Oil and Chemical Work-
ers, Inc. represented employees at the Port Ivory plant; Independent Oil and Chemical Work-
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members for separate contract renewal negotiations at each plant.66 Tactics
employed by Procter & Gamble to exclude "outsiders" 67 from local bargain-
ing included: invocation of the company's access rule, which prohibited visi-
tors from entering Procter & Gamble plants except on guided tours;68
interrogation of the outsiders concerning their role and purpose in negotia-
tions; discontinuance of compensation to employee negotiators; refusal to
grant leaves of absence for conducting union business to the outside em-
ployee negotiators; and denial of requested vacation time to some of the
outside employee negotiators. 69
The Board held that Procter & Gamble's denial of union business time to
outsiders was consistent with past practice in terms of the expired labor con-
tracts and, therefore, was lawful.70 The Board did find, however, that the
company's other actions amounted to unlawful interference with the unions'
right to select their bargaining committee members.71 First, the Board de-
termined that Procter & Gamble's refusal to negotiate on plant premises and
discontinuance of compensation to employee negotiators was retaliation for
the unions' selection of outsiders for bargaining.7 2 Second, the Board found
that Procter & Gamble's denial of vacation time or uncompensated leave to
the outside employee negotiators along with the company's refusal to negoti-
ate on weekends effectively prevented the unions from selecting their bar-
gaining committee members.7 3 To remedy these violations, the Board
ordered Procter & Gamble to reimburse the unions for their share of the rent
for conference rooms where the parties conducted their bargaining, to pay
ers of Kansas City, Kansas, represented employees at the Kansas City plant; Independent Oil
and Chemical Workers of Dallas represented employees at the Dallas plant; Independent Oil
and Chemical Workers represented employees at the Baltimore plant. The Fourth Circuit
found that the four unions wanted to bargain with Procter & Gamble on a multi-plant basis.
658 F.2d at 972.
66. Historically, the parties had negotiated separately at each of the four plants. Before
the 1976 contract renewal negotiations a bargaining committee made up of members employed
at each local plant represented each union in the separate negotiations. The Company paid the
local negotiators for the time they were away from work to engage in collective bargaining. As
an initial step towards establishing a multi-plant bargaining unit, the unions decided that the
bargaining committees for the 1976 and 1977 renewal negotiations would include members
from unions at the other Procter & Gamble plants. In his decision Administrative Law Judge
Bernard Ness discusses the bargaining history at the four Procter & Gamble plants in detail.
See 248 N.L.R.B. at 955-60.
67. The Fourth Circuit defined "outsiders" as "employees at the other three Procter &
Gamble plants whom the negotiating union invited to participate as its bargaining representa-
tives." 658 F.2d at 972 n.3.
68. Procter & Gamble's access rule applied to employees of other Procter & Gamble
plants as well as nonemployees. The access rule caused the parties to conduct bargaining away
from the plant. Since Procter & Gamble refused to bargain at the various union halls, the
parties incurred additional expense for rented conference rooms.
69. For a discussion of Procter & Gamble's efforts to frustrate use of outsiders in negotia-
tions see 658 F.2d at 973-75.
70. 248 N.L.R.B. at 953.
71. Id. at 975.
72. Id. at 973.
73. Id. at 974-75. In holding that Procter & Gamble unlawfully denied some form of
uncompensated leave time to the unions' outside negotiators, the Board relied on Indiana &
Mich. Elec. Co., 235 N.L.R.B. 1128, 1128 (1978), enforced, 599 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1014 (1980).
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local employee negotiators for time missed from work, and to cease and de-
sist from denying uncompensated leave time or vacation time to outside em-
ployee negotiators. 74 The Fourth Circuit enforced the Board's decision and
order in full. 75
In summary, the Board's approval of coordinated bargaining by unions,
although not squarely analogous, suggests that employer coordinated bar-
gaining may be lawful under the Act. Further indication that employer co-
ordinated bargaining is lawful under the labor laws exists in the approval in
the Detroit News case of lockouts in support of another employer's bargain-
ing position outside the context of multi-employer collective bargaining. Re-
gardless of the legality of employer coordinated bargaining under the Act,
houwever, antitrust implications of coordinated bargaining discussed in Part
II demonstrate that employers are not free to engage in coordinated bargain-
ing without fear of legal repercussion.
II. LEGALITY OF MULTI-EMPLOYER COLLECTIVE AND COORDINATED
BARGAINING UNDER ANTITRUST LAWS
In contrast to the relatively settled, albeit sparse, labor law permitting un-
sanctioned multi-employer bargaining relationships, courts have not decided
or even definitively addressed the appropriateness of multi-employer collec-
tive and coordinated bargaining under antitrust principles. In the multi-em-
ployer collective bargaining context joint activities by or agreements between
employers acting unilaterally and not in concert with labor present substan-
tial antitrust issues. Absent any exemption from the antitrust laws, an agree-
ment between multiple employers in a recognized bargaining unit may be
unlawful if the terms of the agreement impose an excessive restraint upon
the business market. 76 Nevertheless, a multi-employer collective unit offers a
case for an exemption from application of the antitrust laws because of the
requisite union consent to multi-employer bargaining in such a situation and
because of policy considerations favoring multi-employer bargaining. 77 On
the other hand, a coordinated bargaining approach, unsanctioned by union
approval, is much less deserving of exemption from antitrust scrutiny. Any
exemption aside, however, even an agreement coordinated by employers
may still not constitute an antitrust violation unless the agreement itself re-
strains the commercial market.
Part A of this section briefly describes the statutory, or express, labor anti-
trust exemptions. Part B discusses a nonstatutory exemption as it relates to
the legality of multi-employer bargaining. Part C addresses coordinated bar-
gaining arrangements from the perspective of the nonstatutory exemption.
Finally, Part D analyzes the legality of coordinated agreements under the
antitrust laws without regard to the applicability of an exemption, basing the
analysis upon the degree of restraint of trade imposed by the arrangement.
74. 248 N.L.R.B. at 953.
75. 658 F.2d 968 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 879 (1982).
76. See infra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
77. See infra notes 84-132 and accompanying text.
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A. Application of Statutory Antitrust Exemption
to Activities of Labor Organizations
As a general proposition, labor organizations are statutorily exempt from
antitrust liability 78 for legitimate labor activities unilaterally undertaken in
furtherance of their own interests.79 An employers' association cannot claim
this statutory exemption, however, since immunity extends only to labor or
union activities and not to the activities of employers.80 The statutory ex-
emption also does not extend to concerted action or agreements between
unions and nonlabor groups.8' Indeed, business enjoys no special exemption
from the antitrust laws.8 2 Accordingly, the statutory exemption does not
insulate a combination of businesses for collective bargaining. Concerted
employer action, whether done in a multi-employer collective bargaining
unit or through coordinated bargaining, can claim no express protection
from the antitrust laws.8 3
78. The Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 104, 105 (1982), prohibits the issuance of
injunctions in cases involving a labor dispute. "Labor dispute" is defined in id. § 113. Clayton
Act §§ 6 and 20, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1982) and 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1982) respectively, declare that
labor organizations are not combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade and specifically
exempt certain union activities from the coverage of the antitrust laws. Clayton Act § 6, 15
U.S.C. § 17 (1982), provides:
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce.
Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the exis-
tence and operation of labor ... organizations, instituted for the purposes of
mutual help ... or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organiza-
tions from lawfully carrying out the legitimate object thereof ....
Clayton Act § 20, 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1982), limits the power of federal courts to issue injunctions
in cases "involving, or growing out of, a dispute concerning terms or conditions of employ-
ment" and specifies that certain actions do not violate any federal law.
79. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 621 (1975);
United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 232 (1941). In Hutcheson the Court stated:
So long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine with non-labor
groups .... the licit and the illicit under § 20 are not to be distinguished by any
judgment regarding the wisdom or unwisdom, the rightness or wrongness, the
selfishness or unselfishness of the end of which the particular union activities are
the means.
Id. (citation omitted).
80. Mackey v. National Football League, 407 F. Supp. 1000, 1008 (D. Minn. 1975), rev'd
on other grounds, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977). The
legislature created the statutory exemption to insulate legitimate collective activity by employ-
ees because federal labor policy favors such activity even though it is inherently anticompeti-
tive. 543 F.2d at 611-12.
81. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 621-22
(1975); United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 232 (1941); Mackey v. National Football
League, 543 F.2d 606, 611 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
82. See Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 616 n.19 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); see also Carpenters Dist. Council v. United Contractors As-
socs., 484 F.2d 119, 121-22 (6th Cir. 1973) (employers' so-called union not entitled to antitrust
law immunity), modified, 539 F.2d 1092 (6th Cir. 1976).
83. See Los Angeles Meat & Provision Drivers Union v. United States, 371 U.S. 94, 99-
100 (1962); Cordova v. Bache & Co., 321 F. Supp. 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (§ 6 does not exempt
joint employer action regarding employee wages), aff'd sub nom. Jacobi v. Bache & Co., 520
F.2d 1231 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1053 (1976). But see California State Council
v. Associated Gen. Contractors, 648 F.2d 527, 544 (9th Cir. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 459
U.S. 519 (1983) (statutory exemption accrued to such units through an exemption relating to
"[b]ecoming or remaining a member ... of any employer organization;" court relied on 29
U.S.C. § 104(b) (1982) read with Clayton Act § 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1982)).
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B. Nonstatutory Antitrust Exemption for Multi-Employer
Bargaining Conduct
Courts have applied a limited nonstatutory antitrust exemption to certain
concerted actions or agreements between unions and nonlabor groups. 84
When a collective bargaining agreement at issue benefits both the labor and
nonlabor group, the nonlabor group may claim the benefit of the nonstatu-
tory exemption.8 5 When, however, employers make an agreement among
themselves concerning negotiations for wages and other terms with the
union, and the union is not a party to the agreement, granting the nonstatu-
tory antitrust exemption to the employers requires an expanded interpreta-
tion of the exemption and reliance on analogous principles from case law
concerning multi-employer collective bargaining.
The nonstatutory exemption immunizes from antitrust laws certain labor-
employer agreements that pertain to issues that are mandatory bargaining
subjects under labor law. Such mandatory bargaining subjects include
wages, hours, and other working conditions. 86 The exemption also applies
84. See Local 189 Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 688-89
(1965). The Supreme Court has held that the limited judicially crafted exemption for certain
agreements is necessary to accommodate the congressional policy favoring free competition in
business markets with the congressional policy favoring collective bargaining under the
NLRA. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622-23
(1975); see Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 611-12 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
85. Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 612 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dis-
missed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977). But see Carpenters Local 1846 v. Pratt-Fransworth, Inc., 690
F.2d 489, 530 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 942 (1983) (labor exemptions to antitrust
laws "offer no shelter for the acts of employers, except perhaps only incidentally").
86. National Labor Relations Act § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982) lists the mandatory
subjects of bargaining. In determining the applicability of the nonstatutory exemption, the
subject matter of the agreement must be considered in light of the national labor policy. Local
189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689 (1965). The Court ex-
plained that the requirement that employers and unions bargain about wages, hours, and
working conditions, "weighs heavily in favor of antitrust exemption for agreements on these
subjects." Id. Employers and unions are not required to bargain about other matters, how-
ever, and as to these, the issue is whether the restriction
is so intimately related to wages, hours and working conditions that the unions'
successful attempt to obtain that provision through bona fide, arm's-length bar-
gaining in pursuit of their own labor union policies, and not at the behest of or
in combination with nonlabor groups, falls within the protection of the national
labor policy and is therefore exempt from the Sherman Act.
Id. at 689-90. Thus, negotiated restrictions as to when and how long employees must work are
within the realm of required bargaining and therefore within the national labor policy. 1d.; see
also American Fed'n of Musicians v. Carroll, 391 U.S. 99, 109, reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 902
(1968) (musicians' price floors are mandatory bargaining subjects because sufficiently related
to employees' wages); Local 24, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 303-04 (1959)
(owner-drivers' minimum equipment rentals are mandatory bargaining subjects because suffi-
ciently related to their wages); NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Wagner Corp., 356 U.S. 342,
349 (1958) (duty to bargain is limited to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment); Wood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 602 F. Supp. 525, 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(college draft rules are mandatory subjects of collective bargaining since rules determine team
acquiring exclusive rights to player); Murphy Tugboat Co. v. Shipowners & Merchants Tow-
boat Co., 467 F. Supp. 841, 856 (N.D. Cal. 1979), aff'd, 658 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1018 (1982) (port pilotage charge ceiling is sufficiently related to employees'
wages to be within the definition of terms and conditions of employment).
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when a union and employer seek to attain goals that are permissive subjects
of bargaining under the Act.87
The exemption permits restraints on competition in the labor market, de-
spite the restraints' effect on price competition in the commercial market,
unless the restraining activity contravenes antitrust policies to a degree not
justified by national labor policies.88 Thus, freedom from antitrust scrutiny
for agreements that inhibit free competition represents an accommodation to
recognized goals of federal labor law.8 9 In assessing claims to this exemp-
tion, the courts have looked to the importance of relevant labor policies to
determine whether to tolerate the decrease in business competition resulting
from conduct that advances the goals of federal labor law.90 Under this test
multi-employer agreements concerning collective bargaining negotiations
with a union should warrant limited protection.
Multi-employer bargaining units, by their nature, involve joint agreements
and activities among employers in connection with their negotiations with
the union. As mentioned before, no express statutory provision authorizes
multi-employer bargaining units. 91 Nevertheless, in NLRB v. Truck Drivers
Local 449 (Buffalo Linen & Credit Exchange)92 the Supreme Court held that
Congress approved the certification and existence of multi-employer bar-
gaining units as vital to the national policy of promoting labor peace.93 In
addition, certain Board rules expressly authorize and regulate multi-em-
87. Feather v. United Mine Workers, 711 F.2d 530, 542 (3d Cir. 1983); James Julian, Inc.
v. Raytheon Co., 593 F. Supp. 915, 923 (D. Del. 1984). An agreement between a union and an
employer outside a collective bargaining relationship, imposing a direct restraint on a business
market that is not justified by congressional labor policy because the restraint has actual or
potential anticompetitive effects that would not flow naturally from the elimination of competi-
tion over wages and working conditions, is not, however, exempt from antitrust scrutiny.
Larry V. Muko, Inc. v. Southwestern Pa. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 609 F.2d 1368,
1373 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 916 (1982).
88. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 625 (1975).
89. Id. at 623. The source for the exemption is "the strong labor policy favoring the
association of employees to eliminate competition over wages and working conditions....
[L]abor policy [therefore] requires tolerance for the lessening of business competition based on
differences in wages and working conditions." Id. at 622; United Mine Workers v. Pen-
nington, 381 U.S. 657, 666 (1965); Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co.,
381 U.S. 676, 692-93 (1965) (White, J., writing for the court in a 6-3 decision with three
Justices concurring in the judgement but dissenting from the Court's opinion). Likewise, the
union has a legitimate goal in organizing workers and standardizing working conditions. Con-
nell, 421 U.S. at 624.
Even where the goal is legal, however, the methods chosen are not immune from scrutiny.
Where the chosen methods impose a direct restraint on the business market and have substan-
tial anticompetitive effects that would not follow naturally from the elimination of competition
over wages and working conditions, antitrust concerns outweigh any labor interest. Id. at 625.
90. Various courts have articulated the test for entitlement to the exemption differently.
As early as 1965 the Court began balancing whether the restraint is intimately related to a
subject protected by national labor policy and whether the agreement's restraint on the prod-
uct market was the least restrictive means necessary to achieve the legitimate interests. Local
189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689-91 (1965); Consolidated
Express, Inc. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 602 F.2d 494, 517-18 (3d Cir. 1979), vacated, 448
U.S. 902 (1980), on remand, 641 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1981); accord Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumb-
ers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 625 (1975).
91. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
92. 353 U.S. 87 (1957) [hereinafter referred to and cited as Buffalo Linen].
93. Id. at 95.
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ployer bargaining units upon the consent of the union and employers. 94
In Buffalo Linen the United States Supreme Court reversed an appellate
holding that Congress did not approve multi-employer bargaining.95 Find-
ing that multi-employer bargaining antedated the federal labor acts and that
Congress affirmatively rejected proposals to limit or prohibit multi-employer
bargaining, the Court concluded that Congress intended to permit such
units.96 Thus, Buffalo Linen furnishes a predicate for an antitrust exemption
by finding congressional authority for multi-employer bargaining units.
The Buffalo Linen decision is also significant in establishing the impor-
tance of multi-employer bargaining units to national labor policy, a neces-
sary prerequisite for shielding concerted employer action from antitrust
examination.9 7  Buffalo Linen evidences Supreme Court recognition that
multi-employer bargaining promotes labor peace through strengthened col-
lective bargaining, 98 thereby furthering the goal of federal labor law, as ex-
pressed in the Wagner Act99 and Taft-Hartley Act, 1°° to promote collective
bargaining. 10 1 Accordingly, multi-employer bargaining units appear to sup-
port a strong national labor policy.
Because of the settled importance of multi-employer bargaining units to
labor law, collateral agreements and activities necessary to the multi-em-
ployer bargaining process are equally vital. Agreements that are intimately
related to a mandatory subject of bargaining warrant immunity. 102 In other
94. California State Council of Carpenters v. Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc., 648 F.2d
527, 544 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing NLRB, TWENTY-THIRD ANNUAL REPORT 36 (1958); 4 T.
KHEEL, LABOR LAW § 14.03[4][b] (1979)), rev'd on other grounds, 459 U.S. 519 (1983).
95. 353 U.S. at 94.
96. Id. at 94-96. The Court noted that industries with numerous employers of small work
forces, and industries with quick employee turnover, had used multi-employer bargaining well
before the Wagner Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169
(1982)). Use of multi-employer bargaining increased greatly after the Act's enactment as em-
ployers attempted to match the unions' increased strength. 353 U.S. at 94-96. At the time of
the debates over amendments to the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120,
61 Stat. 136 (1947) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1982)), moreover, proposals to
limit or outlaw multi-employer bargaining were received with protests that the proposals
would actually weaken collective bargaining and would conflict with the national labor policy
of promoting industrial peace through effective collective bargaining. The Court concluded
that Congress's refusal to outlaw multi-employer bargaining showed its recognition of the de-
vice as essential to effectuate national labor policy. 353 U.S. at 94-96. Moreover, the Court
found that Congress's inaction demonstrated an intention that the Board continue certification
of multi-employer units. Id.
97. One of the requirements stated in Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters
Local 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975), is that the market restraint must advance a legitimate labor
goal to justify a nonstatutory exemption. Id. at 625.
98. 353 U.S. at 95.
99. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
100. Id. §§ 141-197. The Taft-Hartley Act, also known as the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act, supplemented and modified the Wagner Act in several important respects. Among
other things, the Taft-Hartley Act created protection for concerted activities by employees,
prohibited secondary boycott activity by unions, and created a damages action for breach of a
labor contract. See generally H. MILLIS & E. BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER ACT TO TAFT-
HARTLEY 482-513 (1950) (discusses remedies under the Taft-Hartley Act).
101. Local 24, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 294 (1959).




words, when the activity at issue is necessary to make the labor laws work,
an exemption from antitrust liability is necessary. 10 3 This result appears
sound. To apply the antitrust laws to any agreement concerning the joint
bargaining stance of employers in a recognized multi-employer bargaining
unit would eviscerate any practical ability of the member employers to bar-
gain collectively with the union. Antitrust liability would outlaw the very
conduct that, according to the Supreme Court, Congress approved when en-
acting the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts.1° 4
Integral to the analysis of antitrust immunity of a multi-employer bargain-
ing unit is the requirement of consent and recognition by the union, which
agrees to conduct sessions with representatives or committees of numerous
employers in lieu of bargaining separately with each.105 Moreover, despite
Board approval of the existence of multi-employer bargaining units in gen-
eral, it is important to remember that the legality of particular multi-em-
ployer units remains a matter of Board scrutiny. 10 6 Advocates of antitrust
immunity for a multi-employer association may not cite Board approval of
other multi-employer units as support without establishing that the multi-
employer unit in question would meet with Board approval.
The nonstatutory exemption is a policy exemption from antitrust liability
that courts have granted to activity within the recognized purposes of labor
unions.107 Exempting labor union activity and collective bargaining con-
tracts from the antitrust laws depends upon the extent to which conduct
with anticompetitive consequences advances legitimate labor objectives.' 0 8
Because labor and management are encouraged to bargain in multi-employer
units, 10 9 application of the antitrust laws to multi-employer bargaining and
attendant agreements and activities runs counter to national labor policy."I0
The few cases that have considered the propriety of antitrust scrutiny of
103. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963).
104. See Buffalo Linen, 353 U.S. at 95-96 ("[I]n many industries the multi-employer bar-
gaining basis was a vital factor in the effectuation of the national policy of promoting labor
peace through strengthened collective bargaining.")
105. See supra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 23-31 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court gleaned a congres-
sional intent to "leave to the Board's specialized judgment the inevitable questions concerning
multi-employer bargaining bound to arise in the future." Buffalo Linen, 353 U.S. at 96 (quot-
ing Truck Drivers Local 449 v. NLRB, 231 F.2d 110, 121 (2d Cir. 1956), rev'd, 353 U.S. 87
(1957)). Indeed, the Board has special expertise regarding, and often decides, whether a pro-
posed bargaining subject is a term or condition of employment. Local 189, Amalgamated
Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 685-86 (1965). Nevertheless, a Board determina-
tion in labor proceedings will not be conclusive regarding antitrust issues. See id.; Interna-
tional Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators & Asbestos Workers v. United Contractors Ass'n, 494
F.2d 1353, 1354 (3d Cir. 1974).
107. Signatory Negotiating Comm. v. Local 9, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 447 F.
Supp. 1384, 1390 (D. Colo. 1978).
108. Id. at 1391.
109. See, e.g., NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449, 353 U.S. 87 (1957); Brotherhood of
Teamsters Local 70, 214 N.L.R.B. 902 (1974).
110. The Supreme Court has not criticized multi-employer bargaining units. In addition,
the Court has approved union wage scale agreements with multi-employer bargaining units
even though the agreements end price competition based on wages within such units. See
United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 664 (1965).
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joint employer conduct in multi-employer bargaining units have held the
conduct to be within the nonstatutory exemption. A federal district court in
Signatory Negotiating Committee v. Local 9, International Union of Operat-
ing Engineers 11 considered a combination of employers who were negotiat-
ing through a union-recognized bargaining committee." 2 The court found
that the collective bargaining agreement in that case warranted an exemp-
tion from antitrust liability. 113 The court used language indicating that col-
lateral activities might also have warranted an exemption. The court stated
that a combination of employers for the limited purpose of conducting nego-
tiations with a union through a representative committee had no tendency to
restrict competition with employees that are outside the association. 114
Another district court in Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 598 v. Morris115
considered the collateral activity issue directly. In that case the court held
that an agreement made for the purpose of forcing the union to accede to
negotiating demands was, in object and effect, a lawful activity under the
antitrust and labor laws. 1 6 The agreement among the employers in that
case included a decision to lock out employees when the union struck a
member employer. 1 7 The court stressed that national labor policy depends
on collective bargaining agreements and the process for reaching those
agreements," 8 and held that even the alleged conspiracy of forcing union
submission to negotiating demands was entitled to an antitrust exemption. "19
Even if otherwise applicable, the nonstatutory labor exemption can evapo-
111. 447 F. Supp. 1384 (D. Colo. 1978).
112. The Signatory Negotiating Committee served as the collective bargaining agent for
certain Colorado employers in the building, heavy engineering, and utility construction indus-
tries. These employers had assigned their rights to negotiate collective bargaining agreements
with specified labor organizations to the committee.
113. 447 F. Supp. at 1390-91. The court's summary judgment decision dealt with a collec-
tive bargaining agreement that included provisions applicable to subcontractors who had not
signed the agreement. The union enacted the provisions to ensure that all employers of operat-
ing engineers at the same site paid equal wages and benefits. The union attempted to enforce
the provisions through a short-term agreement, not involving the plaintiff committee, but em-
bodying many provisions of the bargaining agreement in force with the plaintiff. The union
also tried to enforce the provisions by requiring that contractors include the terms in their
contracts with subcontractors. The bargaining agreement required subcontractors to join the
union after 31 days of employment at the site.
114. Id. at 1390. The court noted that the individual contractors had assigned their rights
to bargain and that the committee did not represent a trade association. Id. at 1386, 1390.
115. 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,989.
116. Id. at 76,160. The local union sued employers that had agreed to a lockout. The
union alleged that the employers had conspired to lockout union employees to restrain and
monopolize trade and to force the local to agree to their negotiating demands.
117. The local bargained collectively with the Mechanical Contractors Association, a
multi-employer collective bargaining agent for mechanical contracting firms. Only one of the
defendant firms, however, belonged to the association. The other defendant employers com-
peted in the national market and negotiated national collective bargaining agreements with the
local's parent union. Under the national agreements, member employers were permitted to
stop work and lock out employees in the event that the union instituted an area strike over
local contract negotiations.
118. 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 76,153. The court noted that a collective bargaining
agreement, even more than other agreements, contemplates a continuing relationship within
the functional framework created in the agreement. Id.
119. Id. at 76,155.
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rate when the agreement at issue constitutes a direct restraint on competition
in a business market. 120 When a restraint on the business market has sub-
stantial anticompetitive effects that would not follow naturally from elimina-
tion of competition over wages and working conditions, the conduct causing
the restraint is not exempt from the antitrust laws. 12  The courts have ex-
amined this nexus somewhat circuitously by determining whether the bar-
gaining subject causing the restraint on trade is so intimately related to a
mandatory subject of bargaining 122 that it should be protected against anti-
trust liability. ' 2 3 Thus, an agreement as to a nonmandatory subject that sub-
stantially restrains competition in the business market is not exempt from
antitrust scrutiny. 1 24
When employers within a multi-employer unit agree upon mandatory bar-
gaining subjects, assuming that the nonstatutory exemption otherwise at-
taches to them, their agreement should remain immune from antitrust
laws.'12  For example, an agreement by employers on wage terms that they
will bargain for during negotiations with the union, although an agreement
eliminating competition over wages, should nevertheless be exempt from an-
titrust attack.
A lockout agreement among members of a multi-employer bargaining
unit, however, should be viewed separately.126 An agreement to lockout ob-
120. In Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975), the
Court warned that even when a goal is legitimate, the methods used to reach the goal are not
automatically immune. Id. at 625; see Allen Bradley Co. v. Electrical Workers, 325 U.S. 797,
806-11 (1945).
121. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 625 (1975).
122. Labor Management Relations Act § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982), obligates an em-
ployer to confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment. In NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958), the Supreme Court ex-
plained for the first time that matters constituting "wages, hours, and other terms and condi-
tions of employment" are "mandatory subjects" of bargaining. A refusal to bargain on a
mandatory subject is an unfair labor practice under Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hart-
ley) Act § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982). For a discussion of specific matters that are
mandatory subjects of bargaining see C. MORRIS, supra note 26, at 772-844.
123. Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 707 (1965); see
supra note 86. Whether an agreement relates to a mandatory subject of collective bargaining is
to be determined solely under federal labor law. Mackey v. National Football League, 543
F.2d 606, 615 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977). Although the Board's
decision is not conclusive of antitrust liability, its involvement is significant. In Jacobi v. Bache
& Co., 520 F.2d 1231 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1053 (1976), the court considered
the applicability of an exemption to conduct governed by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
The court found that interposition of the antitrust laws to make conduct a violation even
though the conduct is approved by the regulatory agency would prevent the operation of the
Exchange Act as intended by Congress and as effected by SEC regulatory activity. Id. at 1236.
When an implied repeal of antitrust laws is necessary to make the other laws work, such
implied repeal may be justified. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963)
(exemption from antitrust laws will be imposed where necessary to make Exchange Act work).
124. Berman Enters. v. Local 333, 644 F.2d 930, 936 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965
(1981).
125. The protection does not, however, extend to agreements on nonmandatory subjects
such as prices. Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689
(1965); see also American Fed'n of Musicians v. Carroll, 391 U.S. 99, 108 (1968) (courts will
not permit restraints on business markets).
126. Simply stated, a lockout occurs when an employer refuses to allow employees to work
to put economic pressure on the employees and their union to force agreement with the em-
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viously does not contemplate agreement with the union. The agreement is a
defensive arrangement made by employer members to enhance their collec-
tive bargaining strength against the union. This arrangement may nonethe-
less merit exemption if it is characterized as an activity necessary to
maintain a balance of strength in multi-employer bargaining. The district
court in Morris accepted such an analysis. 127
Members of a multi-employer unit may also claim, pursuant to the
Supreme Court's decision in Buffalo Linen, that a lockout is consistent with
labor goals. In Buffalo Linen, finding that employers were bargaining collec-
tively as a unit, the Court reasoned that a strike announced by the union
against one member employer implied that the union might strike other
members of the association in the future. 128 Accordingly, since the threat of
strike action against all members was real, the Court held the nonstruck
employers legally justified in their resort to a temporary lockout of
employees. 129
Under the foregoing analysis, a lockout agreement among members of a
recognized unit may be protected from antitrust scrutiny, not necessarily as
a mandatory subject of bargaining, but as an agreement necessary to support
a legitimate bargaining position.130 Significantly, the Court in Buffalo Linen
found statutory recognition of circumstances in which employers lawfully
could resort to a lockout to maintain their bargaining position: when em-
ployers use the lockout as a defense to a union strike tactic that threatened
the destruction of the employers' interest in bargaining on a group basis. 13'
Given that a lockout agreement among employers is legal under the labor
laws, prohibition of such agreements under antitrust law arguably would
empower labor to achieve the very destruction of the unitary strength that
Congress intended to sanction. Moreover, a lockout agreement represents
ployer's position in collective bargaining or in a labor dispute. See generally Bernhardt, Lock-
outs. An Analysis of Board and Court Decisions Since Brown and American Ship, 57 CORNELL
L. REV. 211 (1972).
127. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 598 v. Morris, 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63-989, at
76,155. The plaintiff local union contended that the lockout halted construction work, a fact
that the court found apparent but unpersuasive. Id. Instead the court explained that arm's-
length bargaining with the use of a strike (by the union) and a lockout (by employers) for the
purpose of requiring a term in a collective bargaining agreement "does not upset the economic
competitive balance and tension built into the Sherman Act." Id. at 76,156. The court found
that labor laws, not antitrust laws, regulated the struggle between the local union and the
employers' association. Id. The court did not, however, focus on the fact that certain of the
alleged conspirators did not bargain directly with the local.
128. The Court stated that the announced strike "necessarily carried with it an implicit
threat of future strike action against any or all of the other members of the Association."
NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449, 353 U.S. 87, 91 (1957).
129. Id.
130. Cf NLRB v. Tomco Communications, Inc., 567 F.2d 871, 884 (9th Cir. 1978) (lock-
out in support of lawful bargaining position legal); Inter-Collegiate Press v. NLRB, 486 F.2d
837, 846 (8th Cir. 1973) (use of lockout in support of legitimate bargaining position not incon-
sistent with right to bargain collectively or right to strike), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 938 (1974);
Detroit Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 372 F.2d 569, 572 (6th Cir. 1967) (just as
employee should not be deprived of right to strike, employers should not be deprived of the use
of a lockout to support a legitimate bargaining position).
131. NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449, 353 U.S. 87, 97 (1957).
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no more than a protective device in labor negotiations and thus affects the
business market only temporarily and only in connection with bargaining for
wages and working conditions. 132
C. Application of Nonstatutory Exemption to Coordinated
Bargaining Approaches
The rationale for exempting from antitrust laws agreements that are
formed between employers before collective bargaining with a union begins
does not apply when the employers are not part of a union-recognized multi-
employer bargaining unit. First, in contrast to multi-employer bargaining,
no authority under federal labor laws recognizes coordinated bargaining as
an important aspect of national labor policy. Second, unlike multi-employer
bargaining, which necessarily occurs with union consent, the intent and ef-
fect of coordinated bargaining is to encumber the union's expectation of in-
dividualized and independent collective bargaining.
1. Coordinated Bargaining Approaches as Related
to National Labor Goals
Two requirements for the nonstatutory exemption are that the market re-
straint resulting from a labor agreement must advance a legitimate labor
goal and that the agreement restraining trade do no more than is necessary
to achieve that goal. 133 In contrast to multi-employer bargaining, which has
been held to be important to national labor policy,' 34 coordinated bargaining
has received minimal attention from the Board and has never been classified
as an important element of national labor policy. Indeed, a union's rejection
of a multi-employer bargaining group undermines any claim that coordi-
nated bargaining promotes the goals of labor law. 135
Considering that employers most often pursue a coordinated approach
when a union objects to bargaining with a unit of employers, the Supreme
Court has suggested that antitrust goals outweigh any labor interest in agree-
ments made outside of a recognized bargaining unit. 136 In United Mine
Workers v. Pennington137 the Court characterized the antitrust laws as
clearly at odds with employer-union agreements that attempt to set labor
standards outside the bargaining unit.138 The Court suggested that applica-
tion of the nonstatutory exemption extends only to mutual management-
132. See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 625-26
(1975).
133. Feather v. United Mines Workers, 494 F. Supp. 701, 714 (W.D. Pa. 1980), aff'd in
part, vacated, and rev'd in part on other grounds, 711 F.2d 530 (3d Cir. 1983).
134. See supra notes 2, 95-101, and accompanying text.
135. Cf Larry V. Muko, Inc. v. Southwestern Pa. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 609
F.2d 1368, 1373 (3d Cir. 1979) (agreement outside collective bargaining relationship can put
restraint on business market that undermines congressional labor policy by producing an-
ticompetitive effects), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 916 (1982).
136. United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 662 (1965).
137. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
138. Id. at 668.
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labor conduct. 139 Consequently, a coordinated approach cannot claim
credence as a recognized means of furthering a legitimate labor goal.14°
One further implication of a union's rejection of a multi-employer unit
requires discussion. Union consent to a multi-employer bargaining unit re-
suits in the union's surrender of freedom to deal independently with employ-
ers in the unit, and to a reciprocal surrender by those employers of the
freedom to bargain separately with the union. This result has led to recogni-
tion of a need to safeguard unit-by-unit bargaining.141 Withholding consent
to a multi-employer unit preserves the union's right to separate bargaining
with employers, and the union should be able to expect that the employer
will meet and bargain solely in its own interests.142 Employees have the
right through their union to meet and confer in good faith with their em-
ployer. 143 This right includes prohibitions against employers from ap-
proaching the bargaining table with closed minds' 44 and from relying on
objectives of a coordinated bargaining association as grounds for refusing to
compromise in a negotiation. When an employer has made a prior pledge to
other employers that he will work toward certain goals, he may breach his
duty to bargain in good faith. To the extent that those goals differ from the
objectives an employer would set individually, he may be avoiding his duty
to bargain individually with the union. Similarly, when a coordinated agree-
ment includes promises by each employer to provide all coordinating em-
ployers with information concerning separate negotiations with the union,
labor's expectation of individual bargaining is undercut.
Finally, coordinated bargaining by employers can be challenged on
grounds that restrictions imposed upon the freedom of a bargaining unit to
make agreements contravene labor policy. 145 The statutory right to bargain
is diminished when the terms of a coordinated bargaining agreement restrict
an individual employer from executing an agreement with the union on
terms and conditions of employment.' 46 Ceilings on wages and other uni-
139. Id.; accord H.A. Artists & Assocs., Inc. v. Actors' Equity Ass'n, 451 U.S. 704, 716-17
n. 19 (1981); Carpenters Local 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc., 690 F.2d 489, 530-31 (5th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 932 (1983).
140. The coordinated approach stands much farther from being an agreement with a labor
group as may be required for a nonstatutory exemption. Unlike the multi-employer unit ap-
proach, the coordinated employer agreement is not "preliminary" to a labor-nonlabor agree-
ment on wages when the union has not agreed to negotiate with an employers' group.
141. Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining, and the Antitrust Laws, 32 U. CHI. L.
REV. 659, 718 (1965).
142. See Smith v. Pro-Football, 420 F. Supp. 738, 742 (D. Mo. 1976) (refusing to extend
exemption to arrangements imposed unilaterally by employers simply because the arrange-
ments could be settled through mandatory collective bargaining; must become part of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement negotiated by a union in its own self-interest), rev'd in part on other
grounds, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
143. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982).
144. NLRB v. Southwestern Porcelain Steel Corp., 317 F.2d 527, 528 (10th Cir. 1963).
145. Cf Embry-Riddle Aeronautical Univ. v. Ross Aviation, Inc., 504 F.2d 896, 902 (5th
Cir. 1974) (union will lose exemption from antitrust laws when it agrees to set wage scale with
certain group of employers).
146. A union engaging in coordinated bargaining is likewise precluded from refusing to
sign a contract embodying agreed terms and conditions of employment pending extension of
the same contract terms to other bargaining units. See Utility Workers Local 111, 203
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form conditions specified in a coordinated agreement restrict the freedom of
individual employers to bargain with a union by binding the employers to
the interests of other employers outside the bargaining unit. Moreover, the
coordinated approach diminishes the union's freedom to bargain with the
other employers. 147 In short, the inherent quality of coordinated bargaining
to interfere with unencumbered bargaining between a single employer and
union, coupled with the lack of recognized policy considerations favoring
coordinated bargaining, strongly indicates that coordinated bargaining
agreements would not receive an exemption from antitrust scrutiny. 48
2. Coordinated Bargaining Is Analogous to Impermissible
Union-Employer Efforts to Impose Contract Terms
upon Other Employers
The legality of conduct under labor law does not necessarily validate the
conduct under antitrust law.' 49 Also, conduct that is improper under fed-
eral labor law may render an antitrust exemption unavailable. For example,
if an agreement contravenes the National Labor Relations Act, the agree-
ment may not be considered a mandatory subject of collective bargaining
and, therefore, may not be eligible for an antitrust exemption.1 50
When an employer has a duty to bargain individually with a union be-
cause the union has objected to multi-employer bargaining, a coordinated
bargaining agreement may be characterized as an attempt to impose wages
and other terms upon nonunit employers. 5 1 Under this scenario, coordi-
nated bargaining is akin to union-employer agreements within a bargaining
unit that restrict terms available to employers in other bargaining units.
N.L.R.B. 230 (1973), enforced sub nom. NLRB v. Utility Workers, 490 F.2d 1383 (6th Cir.
1974); Standard Oil Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 690 (1962), enforced, 322 F.2d 40 (6th Cir. 1963).
147. See, e.g., Zimmerman v. National Football League, 632 F. Supp. 398, 406 (D.D.C.
1986) (labor exemption requires a bargained for, as opposed to unilaterally imposed, condi-
tion); Morse Bros., Inc. v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 701, 1974-2 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 75,412, at 98,362 (D. Or. 1974) (union by agreement with multi-employer unit,
gave up freedom to deal with individual employers).
148. But cf Burbash & Wile, supra note 34, 11.03[2] (arguing that because coordinated
bargaining arises in the course of collective bargaining, it should be protected by the nonstatu-
tory exemption).
149. Morse Bros., Inc. v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 1974-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 75,412, at 98,361 (D. Or. 1974); see Sun-Land Nurseries, Inc. v. Southern Cal. Dist.
Council of Laborers, [Current] Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,180, at 63,071 (9th Cir. 1986).
150. Consolidated Express, Inc. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 602 F.2d 494, 513 (3d Cir.
1979), vacated on other grounds, 448 U.S. 902 (1980), on remand, 641 F.2d 90 (1981). In
Feather v. United Mine Workers, 494 F. Supp. 701 (W.D. Pa. 1980), aff'd in part, vacated,
and rev'd in part on other grounds, 711 F.2d 530 (3d Cir. 1983), however, the district court
applied the exemption to an illegal labor practice when the agreement arose out of a
mandatory subject of bargaining and the market restraint was reasonably necessary to accom-
plish the goal. Id. at 719.
151. See United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 665-66 (1965); see also Federal
Maritime Comm'n v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 435 U.S. 40, 60 (1978) (collective bargaining
agreement for nonmember use of dockworkers); Berman Enters., Inc. v. Local 333, United
Marine Div., 644 F.2d 930, 936 (2d Cir.) (collective bargaining agreement clause requiring
affiliates to operate under the contract), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981).
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Such agreements are impermissible. 15 2
Just as an employer and union may not lawfully pressure other employers
to accept certain contract terms, the antitrust laws appear to forbid a combi-
nation of employers from pressuring a union to accept the employers' com-
mon terms.153 If the agreements involving the union are not exempt under
the antitrust laws, 154 the absence of the union from coordinated bargaining
agreements ensures that coordinated agreements would not be exempt. Sim-
ilarly, when the purpose of a coordinated agreement extends beyond protect-
ing area wages and working conditions towards other objectives, exemption
will not be granted. 155 All exemptions from the antitrust laws, including the
labor exemption, are narrowly construed. 156
D. Restraint of Trade Analysis of Coordinated Bargaining Agreements
Under the Antitrust Laws Without Regard to Exemptions
Should coordinated bargaining efforts not warrant the labor antitrust ex-
emption, the general antitrust laws would apply just as though the agree-
ments were outside the labor bargaining context, 57 and, under those laws,
the mere combination of a union and nonlabor group is not prohibited. 58
Likewise, the mere fact that an agreement has some anticompetitive effects
not flowing naturally from the elimination of competition over wages and
working conditions does not lead automatically to invalidation of the agree-
ment under the antitrust laws. An agreement must still be examined under
traditional antitrust analysis to determine if it has a sufficiently anticompeti-
tive effect to constitute an antitrust violation.1 59 An agreement among em-
ployers will not violate the antitrust laws unless it has either the purpose or
substantial effect of unreasonably restraining trade. 160
An agreement among employers concerning wage costs and other terms
that affect product price, outside the context of an exempt collective bargain-
152. See Utility Workers Local 111, 203 N.L.R.B. 230, 239 (1973), enforced, 490 F.2d
1383 (6th Cir. 1974).
153. In James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 593 F. Supp. 915 (D. Del. 1984), one defendant
argued that two employers joined as "joint venturers" and therefore attained a legally sufficient
collective bargaining nexus with the union, even though one of the employers was not in a
collective bargaining relationship with the union. The court rejected this theory as a basis for
protection from antitrust scrutiny. Id. at 925.
154. See Ramsey v. United Mine Workers, 401 U.S. 302, 313 (1971); United Mine Workers
v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 665 (1965).
155. James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 593 F. Supp. 915, 924 (D. Del. 1984).
156. Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 229-30 (1979); Abbott
Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Ass'n, 425 U.S. 1, 11 (1976); Pan Alaska Trucking
v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 621 F. Supp. 800, 802 (D. Alaska 1985).
157. Morse Bros., Inc. v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 1974-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 75,412, at 98,359-60 (D. Or. 1974).
158. Mid-America Regional Bargaining Ass'n v. Will County Carpenters Dist. Council,
675 F.2d 881, 887 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860 (1982); Bodine Produce, Inc. v. United
Farm Workers Org. Comm., 494 F.2d 541, 558 (9th Cir. 1974).
159. Larry V. Muko, Inc. v. Southwestern Pa. Bldg. Constr. Trades Council, 670 F.2d 421,
426-27 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 916 (1982).
160. L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 194, 303-04 (1977).
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ing situation, would constitute price fixing.' 61 Such an agreement may also
be characterized as a concerted refusal to deal, as it embodies an agreement
between two or more persons to do business with other individuals only on
specified terms.' 62 Nevertheless, since Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers
& Steamfitters Local 100 163 a restraint on the product market is permissible
under the antitrust laws, if the restraint results from the elimination of com-
petition on wages among employers.' 64 A joint employer agreement to set
ceilings on individual bargaining for acceptable wages, a likely element in a
coordinated bargaining agreement, can be said to have no effect on the busi-
ness market, a distinction made by the Connell court. 165 Accordingly, the
Fifth Circuit in Carpenters Local No. 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc. 166 noted
that in order for a restraint of trade to be actionable under the antitrust laws,
the conduct must restrain commercial competition in the marketing of goods
and services.' 67 Without evidence of a conspiracy to restrain competition in
the marketing of goods, a concerted refusal to deal with the union concern-
ing wage rates and working conditions does not state an antitrust claim.
168
Lockout agreements also come under antitrust scrutiny. As noted earlier,
a practice that may be legal under the labor laws does not automatically
receive immunity from the antitrust laws. A bare lockout agreement that
could be condoned as simply an attempt to maintain a bargaining position
with the union' 69 may nonetheless be objectionable when the lockout deci-
sion is based solely upon the employers' agreement among themselves and
not on an independent determination by each employer of its own needs and
interests.
161. Jacobi v. Bache & Co., 377 F. Supp. 86, 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d 1231,
1236 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1053 (1976).
162. Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 618 (8th Cir. 1976) (citing Note,
Concerted Refusals to Deal Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1531 (1958));
see also Morse Bros., Inc. v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 1974-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 75,412, at 98,364 (D. Or. 1974) (refusal to deal resulted in anticompetitive effects).
163. 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
164. Id. at 622; see supra cases cited at note 90.
165. 421 U.S. at 622-23; see also Newspaper Drivers & Handlers' Local 372 v. NLRB, 404
F.2d 1159, 1162-63 (6th Cir. 1968) (agreement between employers to provide strikebreakers
had no purpose or effect beyond the scope of the labor dispute; did not affect market prices or
free competition), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 923 (1969).
166. 690 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 932 (1983).
167. 690 F.2d at 532 (citing Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 495 (1940)); accord
Berman Enters., Inc. v. Local 333, United Marine Div., 644 F.2d 930, 937 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981); Kennedy v. Long Island R.R., 319 F.2d 366, 372-73 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 830 (1963).
168. It is true that a concerted refusal to deal with a union may result in a restraint
on competition in the marketing of labor; it may have anticompetitive effects on
wages and working conditions (as does the existence of a successful union it-
self). However, this anticompetitive effect is not enough without more to fulfill
the requirements of the Sherman Act.
690 F.2d at 532 (emphasis added); see also Prepmore Apparel, Inc. v. Amalgamated Clothing
Workers, 431 F.2d 1004, 1006-07 (5th Cir. 1970) (antitrust claim dismissed; court found no
conspiracy or combination although employer refused to bargain with union regarding em-
ployment conditions), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 801 (1971).
169. NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449, 353 U.S. 87 (1957).
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In Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 598 v. Morris 170 a union challenged on
antitrust grounds a lockout agreement among employers. The court held
that no competitive relationship, for antitrust purposes, existed between the
employers and the union. 171 Furthermore, the court held that the refusal to
deal effected by the lockout was not the product of an anticompetitive mo-
tive. 172 Accordingly, the court rejected the lockout as evidence of an anti-
trust claim or injury. Indeed, the court affirmatively found that the objective
of the lockout, to reduce labor's bargaining strength to bring the union in
line with the employer's bargaining demands, was not an objective forbidden
by the antitrust laws. 173
When the anticompetitive effect of a combination does not reach beyond
collective bargaining negotiations and associated labor relations, an antitrust
claim cannot stand. 174 In Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union
v. J.P. Stevens & Co. 175 the union complained of an employer's attempt to
impede union organizing efforts. Finding that the employer's actions had no
monopolistic effect upon competition in the goods and services marketplace,
the court concluded that the union had no valid antitrust claim. 176
In Carpenters Local 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc., 177 the court held, con-
sistent with Amalgamated Clothing, that unless a complainant can allege an-
ticompetitive effects outside of the labor market, a bare claim of refusal to
deal with the union will not state an antitrust claim. 178 Notably, in Pratt-
Farnsworth the court found that the complaint alleged that the defendant
170. 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,989 (E.D. Wash. 1981).
171. Arms length bargaining with the use of strike and lockout for the purpose of
requiring a term in a collective bargaining agreement does not upset the eco-
nomic competitive balance and tension built into the Sherman Act. [citing Pen-
nington] The natural competitive relationship between [the union and employer
organization], directly connected to these organizations' "raison d'etre", is not
in the realm of commercial competition. Rather it is in the realm of pure eco-
nomics-the historical struggle between management and labor with each at-
tempting to maximize its own :nterests. The labor laws and not the antitrust
laws regulate this struggle.
Id. at 76,156 (emphasis in original).
172. The court stated:
Assuming Plaintiff could prove an agreement, that agreement, Plaintiff main-
tains, was an "agreement in anticipation of and for the purpose of forcing" the
union to accede to negotiating demands. Both the object and effect of such an
arrangement would be lawful under the Sherman Act.... Plaintiff alleges the
effect of the concerted activity was to halt construction work at Hanford. This,
of course, is a necessary effect of a lockout. It is a tautology to assert that a
lockout halted work and this is not an effect Congress prohibited by enacting the
Sherman Act.
Id. at 76,155 (emphasis added).
173. Id.
174. Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Wetterau Foods, Inc., 597 F.2d 133 (8th Cir. 1979)(employer replaced striking union employees with personnel provided by wholesale food sup-
plier); see also Kennedy v. Long Island R.R., 319 F.2d 366 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 830
(1963) (employers' agreement for strike insurance plan alleged to have anticompetitive effect
on labor market was not concern of the antitrust laws).
175. 475 F. Supp. 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), vacated as moot, 638 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1980).
176. 475 F. Supp. at 490.
177. 690 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 932 (1983).
178. 690 F.2d at 534.
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employers not only refused to deal with the union, but also refused to deal
with contractors who used union workers. 179 The defendants' alleged con-
duct toward the contractors constituted direct anticompetitive action, and,
thus, supported an antitrust claim. 180 Even conceding that the purpose of
the agreement was only to impose a restraint upon the labor market, which
was legal, the court followed Connell and focused on the means by which the
restraint was imposed.'81 Since the method used to restrain the labor mar-
ket also restrained commercial competition, an antitrust violation existed.' 
82
III. CONCLUSION
In summary, a union-recognized and Board-regulated multi-employer col-
lective bargaining unit is a deserving candidate for the benefits of the non-
statutory exemption from antitrust scrutiny. To grant the exemption to the
collective bargaining unit would be consistent with and in furtherance of
national labor goals and policies; to deny the exemption would contravene
these policies.
Yet even if the exemption applies, the nature of the agreement must be
evaluated to ensure that its terms are intimately related to permissible bar-
gaining subjects. As long as the agreement concerns mandatory subjects of
bargaining, it likely will not lose the exemption. Under a sympathetic view,
even a lockout agreement among members of a union-sanctioned employer
bargaining unit could be viewed as a unified employer response to a threat by
the union and a protective activity essential to maintaining the balance of
bargaining strengths.
On the other hand, a coordinated combination of employers who are
bound to bargain individually with the union will not likely receive nonstat-
utory exemption from antitrust liability absent union consent to the combi-
nation. Nevertheless, if a coordinated employers' agreement can be
characterized as a combination restraining only collective bargaining for
wages and other terms of employment, the uncertainty of the applicability of
an exemption may be immaterial because the restraint itself may not state an
actionable antitrust claim.
179. Id. at 534-35.
180. Id. The court explained that the defendants' alleged conduct affected competition by
reducing the number of jobs available for contractors who utilized union workers. Id. at 534.
181. Id. at 535.
182. Id.
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